Research Summary
Muslim Papua and Special Autonomy:
The Identity Contest in Papua

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Introduction

This article is a summary of a research thesis for the Department of Sociology, University of Indonesia, in 2008; research that was sponsored by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES).

At the fall of the New Order a definition of the political identity of the Papuans was established to differentiate native Papuans from immigrants. The Papuan political identity is based on the perception that people of the Melanesian race are black, have curly or frizzy hair and are Christian (Kivimaki and Thorning, 2002; Widjojo, 2005). This definition has been exploited by Papuan élites as a political instrument, but it runs counter to the development of an inclusive and tolerant Papuan identity. The Papuan ethnic groups in Fak-fak, Kaimana, Raja Ampat, Biak, Serui and Sorong that are Muslim and have a long history of interracial marriage are, under that definition, excluded. The formal debate on Papuan identity can be traced to the following: the Majelis Rakyat Papua (MRP, Papuan People's Assembly) rejected the candidature of one of the vice-governor's nominees in a provincial gubernatorial election in 2005 because the candidate had Arabic ancestry, that is, he was not Papuan because he did not fit the approved definition (*Kompas*, 19 November 2005; International Crisis Group, 2006).

Law 21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua defined a native Papuan as a person from one of the Melanesian ethnic groups or an immigrant who has been accepted and recognised by ethnic groups in Papua. However in reality, native Papuans can be differentiated according to their religion; Christian (Protestant), Catholic or Muslim. Involved in the debate to determine Papuan political identity are negotiations between Christian Papuans and the Muslim Papuans. The differences of interpretation of Papuan identity are constructed by intellectuals and élites of Papua and go hand in hand with the idea of re-Papuanisation. The intersection of race, ethnic grouping and religion becomes relevant in the context of Special Autonomy. In this context, Muslim Papuans questioned the definition and the assumption that native Papuans be identified as Christian.

The theme of this study is an examination of the strategy of Muslim Papuans to be recognised equally in Papua in the period of Special Autonomy. To do this required answers to the following questions. How do Muslim Papuans construct their cultural identity in the period of Special Autonomy? How do Muslim Papuans reconcile their cultural identity with Muslim immigrants? How do the Muslim Papuans reconcile their cultural identity with Christian Papuans? Bourdieu (1991) has stated that identity is a practical category. It is objectified mental representations through social practices and internalised objective cultural signs through symbolic manipulation strategies. Identity construction is conducted via symbolism and power struggles among the social actors.

Muslim Papua is an *adat* community whose members follow Islam; Christian Papua is an *adat* community that embraces Christianity (Protestant and Catholic).[1] An *adat* community, according to law 21 of 2001, comprises native Papuans living in and bound to a particular area with a high degree of solidarity among its members. Muslim Papua is

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[1]   Based on law 21 of 2001, *adat* is the term that covers the hereditary customs that are acknowledged, adhered to, institutionalised and maintained by the local *adat* community.

represented by Majelis Muslim Papua (MMP, Papuan Muslim Assembly.[2] Christian Papua looks for guidance to the Theology Institute of IS Kijne, the Theology Institute of Walter Post, the Evangelical Church of Papua, the Baptist Church, the association of churches in Manokwari, the association of churches in Pegunungan Jayawijaya and the Bishop of Jayapura. The term 'Christian' in Papua refers to Protestants and to Catholics although there are many differences between them. Immigrant Muslims are those people not born in Papua and who are followers of Islam. They are represented by Islamic organisations such as MUI (Indonesian Ulamah Assembly), Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, ICMI (Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association) and Yapis (Islamic Education Foundation in Papua).

The struggle by Papuan Islamic organisations to have their cultural and political identity legitimised and accepted involves them in an area where politics and religion meet. This research covers the reasons for, and the background to, the establishment of the Papua Muslim Assembly on 13 April 2007. The data were collected by observation, in-depth interviews and archival research. The field work was in Jayapura over the period 17 February to 17 April 2008. The resources that contributed information are a number of senior members of Islamic organisations, churches and cultural communities, and local politicians.

The Social Context in Papua

There is a good deal of conjecture about the etymology of 'Papua'. It is said to be derived from the Malay *papua* or *puah-puah* meaning 'frizzy-haired', referring to the curly hair of the inhabitants. Modern English, Dutch and Spanish encyclopaedias, as well as lexicographical and etymological dictionaries, leave it at that. Another possibility is that it comes from the Biak phrase *sup i babwa*, which means the land below (the sunset).

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2   As a note, there are few immigrant Muslims occupying the first echelon in this organisation, mainly the secretary-general and treasurer-general.

The population of Papua Province (less West Papua) in 2006 was 2,524,275 people. Christians (Protestant) comprise 55 per cent of the province's population; Catholics, 30 per cent; Muslims, 14 per cent; Hindus, 0.17 per cent; and Buddhists, 0.39 per cent. The great majority of the Muslim population of Papua are immigrants who have arrived as a result of the transmigration policies or for other reasons (Iribaram, 2008: 5). In 1971, immigrants made up 4 per cent of the population of Papua; in 2000, the figure was 35 per cent immigrant (Gibbons, 2004: 26). Fifteen years ago, native Papuans made up 90 per cent of the population (SKP, 2006: 9). In 2003, 90 per cent of the people who live in the cities and towns are immigrants who dominate the local economies and control trade, labour, transport, private offices and other businesses (*Kompas*, 23 February 2003). The extensive changes to Papua's social and economic structures have left native Papuans in a subordinate position economically, socially and politically, and have allowed the immigrants to dominate. The relative positions of the immigrants and native Papuans in the social and economic hierarchy, one dominant and one subordinate, has given rise to two classes of citizen and to two political and social identities.

The social and political circumstances are significant in Papua. The debates between Indonesian and Papuan nationalists about the history of Papuan integration are based on the assumptions of Indonesian and Papuan political identity (Elisabeth, 2004: 22–37; Thorning and Kivimaki, 2002: 652). For Indonesian nationalists, Papua is part of the Indonesian nation regardless of racial differences. For Papuan nationalists, Papua-ness is based on racial differences between Indonesians and Papuans. According to them, the Act of Free Choice in 1969 was manipulated by the national government of Indonesia, which did not select the 1025 Papuan representatives impartially. But that apart, the West Papua state was proclaimed in 1961. Therefore, Papua-ness is a political identity created by the experiences of Papuans during colonial times and is seen as the antithesis of Indonesia-ness (Chauvel,

2005: 54). The Papuan élites think that Papua was an object in the decolonisation process without being a participant (Chauvel, 2005: 82).

The Indonesian presence in Papua since 1962 has brought political violence to Papua (Elisabeth, 2004: 38). The violence towards native Papuans is a consequence of the government strategy to cope with the separatist movement led by Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM, Free Papua Movement). The experiences of Papuans at the hands of the Indonesian authorities have generated a collective memory of suffering known as *memoria passionis* (Giay, 2006: 6). Gibbons (2006) stated that the feeling of Papua-ness became stronger during the New Order because of the economic and social development in Papua, which has marginalised the native Papuans and benefited the immigrants. Giving Papua Special Autonomy status was not an ideal way of coping with the separatism, but was a result of political negotiations between Indonesian nationalists and Papuan élites. It was a unilateral concession from Jakarta and has no relation to the main political groups advocating Papuan independence, such as the Free Papua Movement and Presidium Dewan Papua (PDP, Papuan Presidium Council) (Gibbons, 2004b: viii). With the political context in mind, this study assumes that the political orientation of the immigrant population tends to Indonesian nationalism and that of the native Papuans tends to Papuan nationalism.

As well as knowing and understanding the economic and political contexts of Papua, the cultural environment needs to be taken into account as well. Data collected by interview show that native Papuans still defer to traditional Melanesian systems of belief because Christianity and Islam are seen as 'a family religion'.[3] The customs, cultural traditions and beliefs are still part of the modern everyday life of Christian and Muslim Papuans. Whiteman (in Alua, 2006: 14) explained that the most central value for culture and religion of Melanesia is continuity of life, preservation of life, protection of life

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3   According to interviews in Jayapura on 4 March 2008 with Dr Jose Mansoben, an anthropologist from Cenderawasih University, Jayapura; and on 7 April 2008 with the Reverend JF Onim of the Theology Institute of IS Kijne, Jayapura, 'family religion' refers to the phenomenon of there being more than one religion in a family.

and celebration of life. These values and traditions are what Christian and Muslim Papuans have in common and this shared outlook helps to bring the two religious groupings together: what they have in common is their Melanesian heritage. In colonial times, inter-religion differences were not significant. Although there are many religions in Fak-fak and Kaimana, the native Papua is bound by cultural tradition and kinship, which has supported their modern religious practices to become more tolerant, open and moderate. It is identified as the habitus of the religions of the native Papuan.

The Christian presence came into Papua through Manokwari when two German missionaries, CW Attouw and GJ Geissler, landed on Mansinam Island on 5 February 1855. Catholics crossed the threshold of Papua in 1896 in Merauke, and missionary activity began in 1902 (Soedharto, 1989: 53–61). According to Mansoben, the purpose of the Christian mission in Papua was to unite the Melanesian tribes into one common (and Christian) community. Thomas Arnold said that Papuan tribes on Gebi Island had been Islamised by Moluccan immigrants since 1606 (Athwa, 2004: 44). The Spanish sailor, Louis Vaes de Torres, found Muslim traders from Ternate, Tidore and Makassar preaching Islam in Onim Fak-fak (Soedharto, 1989). The Sultanate of Bacan in the northern Moluccas had occupied parts of western Papua, such as Waigeo, Misool, Waigama and Salawati, since the 16th century (Athwa, 2004: 44). FC Kamma (1981: 61) also said that in 1500, the Papuan people on the western and northern coastal areas lost their sovereignty when Sultan Tidore appointed his deputies to collect tribute, such as slaves and *cenderawasih* (bird of paradise). Islam is recognised as being the first foreign religion to come to Papua but its role in developing civilisation was very limited because Islam spread by personal contact rather than by organised proselytising institutions.

Bourdieu (1991: 9) considers that Papuan political preoccupations up to the present have been influenced by the many political currents and eddies since colonisation. Before colonisation, a Papuan's political or social allegiance was to the tribe. Papua's Special Autonomy status

expanded the area of political activity and, subsequently, political identity is not a matter of tribal affiliation so much as loyalty to groups and cultures that are not part of Papuan traditions. Political dialogue is now between those who identify with one of four major groupings: Papuan Christians, Papuan Muslims, immigrant Christians and immigrant Muslims. This study focuses on how the Muslim Papuans create their cultural identity in the field of identity politics. The next part will explain how the Muslim Papuans constructed their identity through political discourse and the establishment of the Papua Muslim Assembly.

Identity Construction of the Muslim Papua

Muslim Papua is symbolised by Majelis Muslim Papua (MMP, Papua Muslim Assembly), which is a successor to Solidaritas Muslim Papua (SMP, Papua Muslim Solidarity) and was founded by 47 Muslim members of the élite in Papua on 21 November 1999 and among their number were Thaha M Alhamid, Aroby A Aituarouw, L Anum Siregar and Sayyid Fadhal Alhamid. SMP was one of the ways for Muslim Papuans to build their cultural identity in Papua. Papuan Christians were successful in developing a Papuan nationalist sentiment that equated with Indonesian nationalism but the Papuan Muslim community was conscious of its ambivalent position in the quest for political identity between Indonesia-ness and Papua-ness. The establishment of SMP in 1999 could not be separated from the political context of the awakening of the native Papua. On 26 February 1999, a few of months before the formation of SMP, 100 Papuan élites began a national dialogue with President BJ Habibie and expressed a political declaration that they wanted Papua to separate from Indonesia (Alua, 2002: 10).

The political tension in Papua in 1999 was exacerbated by the dominant presumption in the mass media that Islam was inseparable from what it means to be Indonesian. Papua, in contrast, was identifying itself as Christian, Melanesian and separatist. According to L Anum Siregar,

Secretary-General of MMP and chairperson of ALDP (Alliance of Democracy for Papua), the MMP was formed to counter, ameliorate and lessen the tension and conflicts between native Papuans and Indonesians that followed from annexation, transmigration and military operations. It was reinforced by the reports of NGOs and churches that the identification of the native Papuans as Melanesian, Christian and separatist was a cause of political conflict and violence in Pegunungan Tengah, a region that was subjected to military operations.

The reasons for establishing the MMP were, first, to counter the proposition that Islam is identical with Indonesia. Not all Muslims are on the side of Indonesia and not all native Papuans are Christian. The second reason is that it is a communication bridge between Muslim immigrants and Christian Papuan society. It provides evidence that the social construct of identity that posits that Indonesia is Islamic and Papua is Christian is not correct. The third is that the MMP is helping to enable the full recognition of native Papuans. It is an advocate for their rights including tribes' traditional territorial rights (*tanah adat*). The fourth reason is that the MMP is a form of countervailing influence against Islamic organisations, mainly the MUI, which tends to empower Muslim immigrants and has no roots in Papuan Muslim communities. The fifth reason is that the MMP is an Islamic institution that advocates for human rights and for reducing and eliminating the economic disparities between native Papuans and the immigrants.

The theological foundation of Majelis Muslim Papua (MMP) is no different from other Islamic organisations; it promotes the ideal that Islam is *rahmatan lil 'alamin* (a blessing for all universes). Closer to the ground it works to improve the welfare of its followers. The MMP emphasises in its public declarations to the non-Muslim communities that the MMP does not want to create an exclusive community; that it does not attempt to enforce Islamisation; and that the MMP does not extend to religious fundamentalism. The role of the MMP is cooperation with the government, an insistence on justice and the social welfare of the people, and collaboration and cooperation with church leaders

to ensure that Papua is a peaceful land. The objectives of the MMP are, first, to ensure that society is structured in a way that will enable Muslims to lead good lives, and for religious tolerance. The second is advancing Muslim welfare through education and health services, economic independence, environmental preservation, social and cultural emancipation, and human rights enforcement.

The term 'Muslim Papuan' is a politically construct and is used to differentiate them from immigrant Muslims. Differences between Muslim Papuans and Muslim immigrants do not seem apparently in Fak-fak and Kaimana, but this is not so in other regencies and cities of Papua, especially Jayapura. The significance of differentiating Papuan Muslims from immigrant Muslims is that the Papuan Muslims are not at a cultural distance from their fellow Papuans, most of whom are Christian. The Papuan Muslims' religious outlook is one of moderation, tolerance, openness, inclusiveness and emphasises dialogue. They understand that the culture they share with their fellow citizens enables communication and understanding and they do not regard religious differences as significant; their common cultural and traditions bind communities more strongly than religion might set them apart. An example of the tolerant social attitudes is the practice of sending Christmas greetings to Christian communities.

The Majelis Muslim Papua (MMP) identifies with and supports the struggle for human rights: many members of the MMP central committee are activists from the Alliance for Democracy in Papua (ALDP), an NGO in Jayapura that is an advocate for human rights (Bourdieu, 1991). The political habitus of the MMP can be categorised as constructively critical, anti-status quo and anti-violence; it has good stocks of social and symbolic capital. The MMP has close relations with Christian organisations and NGOs in Papua. The founder of MMP, Thaha M Alhamid, is secretary-general of the Papua Presidium Council (PDP), an institution of the Papua political independence movement. The MMP's good reputation has enabled it to be more readily accepted by Christian Papuan communities than other Islamic organisations.

The MMP draws its support from all seven ethnic cultural traditions in Papua.

The establishment of the MMP can be interpreted as an effort by the Muslim Papuans to put some substance to their dream for the future by understanding their history. For an organisation representing a community that is in a subordinate position, history is a way to search for and understand their identity that will counter the definition of their identity that has been constructed by the dominant group. The interpretation or version of history by the dominant groups functions to legitimise their dominance. Sociologically, the MMP represents Muslim Papuans, who are in a subordinate position, to gain recognition of their cultural identity. From Bourdieu's (1995) perspective, the founding of the MMP can be understood as the creation of symbolic capital. Symbolic capital may be defined as the resources available to a person on the basis of honour, prestige and recognition and it functions as an authoritative embodiment of cultural values. Acknowledging Muslim Papuans as Papuan natives at the same time recognises their rights to have similar roles in Papua as do the Christian Papuans. The problem remains that it is the immigrant Muslims and Papuan Christians who predominate and who have the largest share of symbolic capital. The following section will shed light on how the Papuan Muslims assert their identity against the Muslim immigrants.

Muslim Papuans and Muslim Immigrants

There are a number of Islamic organisations that cater for immigrants and these, along with the MMP, are the organisations that support and enable the practical, day-to-day matters of religion in the lives of Muslims in Papua.. The immigrant-based Islamic organisations are the MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia), Yapis (Yayasan Pendidikan Islam di Tanah Papua), Muhammadiyah, NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia), Hidayatullah, HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), Assalam, LDII (Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia) and

BKPRMI (Badan Koordinasi Pemuda dan Remaja Masjid Indonesia. MUI, Muhammadiyah, Yapis, NU and ICMI are the most significant of these organisations. MUI is an Islamic institution acknowledged by the national government as a representiative for Islamic people; Yapis is accepted by local governments for their work for education in Papua. Muhammadiyah and NU have status because they have had a presence in Papua since early integration. ICMI is renowned because its chairperson, Musa'ad, was one of the negotiators for the Special Autonomy status of Papua. From observations of their political habitus, these Islamic organisations are similar in two respects, that is, they are uncritical and they align with the status quo. Their religious and social roles are in education, in economic development, in spreading Islamic thought, supporting Indonesian political institutions, and wearing Islamic symbols. Their influence derives from their political habitus and their capital (material, cultural, social and symbolic), and their interest in maintaining Indonesia's political unity. These organisations are more influential compared with the MMP.

The MMP is dissimilar to the organisations listed in the previous paragraph; it is critical, anti-status quo and anti-violence and stands for ensuring that Papua is a land of peace. Individual members of the MMP are advocates for human rights and take part in Papuan political movements. These activities and attitudes do not endear the MMP to other Islamic organisations and puts it in a marginal position, in part because they have little capital of any description. Islamic organisations have a symbiotic relation with politics and consequently, the objective relations between Islamic organisations and the MMP are parallel to the objective relations between Indonesian and Papua nationalism.

One way of understanding the differences between the MMP and the other Islamic organisations is its practice of wishing the Papuan Christians a merry Christmas. The orthodox Islamic view is that wishing Christians a merry Christmas is prohibited because it implies indirectly recognition that there is another God apart from Allah. Therefore, few Islamic organisations wish Christians a merry Christmas. The MUI, under Buya

Hamka in 1974, declared that it is forbidden for Islamic organisation to wish fellow Papuans a merry Christmas. However, the MMP follows a different principle, it asserts that Christmas greetings can be justified for Islamic communities in Papua as an expression or manifestation of culture and it has become a cultural tradition between Papuan Muslims and Christians. The action of the MMP to display a Christmas banner on 25 December 2007 is an inseparable part of the culture of the native Papuans. One inference from the display of the banner is that the MMP wished to differentiate itself from the organisations that supported the views of Muslim immigrants.

Almost all Islamic organisations accept the premiss of *Al Qur'an* that Islam is *rahmatan lil 'alamin* (a blessing for the whole world) and is not constrained by ethnicity. Nevertheless, the interpretation of *rahmatan lil 'alamin* is not consistent in the social practices of various Islamic organisations. The NU takes *Islam rahmatan lil 'alamin* to mean that Islam is more moderate and accepting of local culture. According to the secretary of NU Papua, the NU provides understanding of moderate Islam and initiates dialogue. In contrast to the NU, the Muhammadiyah does not advocate assimilation of local cultures to Islamic values. The Muhammadiyah emphasises the elimination of cultural traditions that are not consistent with Islamic principles. At present, different from the Muhammadiyah and the NU, the MMP has stated that Islam should be *rahmatan lil Papua*; that is, it interprets *Islam rahmatan lil 'alamin* as *Islam rahmatan lil Papua*, which means that Islam will be blessing for all universes if Islam can be a blessing first for the people of Papua. This point of view does not mean that the MMP is advocating an ethnicity-based Islam, but it puts Islam into a social context, that is, the Papuan community.

It is a reflection of their political reflexes that Islamic organisations are inclined to follow the political necessity of maintaining the Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI, Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia). It can be easily understood that the political outlook of Islamic organisations representing Muslim immigrants will reflect the

politics of the state. Thus, when the activities of Islamic organisations affect or are affected by field of politics, they do not question the political status, history and political identity of Papua. As consequence, there is a closeness in political orientation between Islamic organisations and government officials in Papua to maintain the political integration of Papua according to the government's perspective. In the field of Islamic organisations, those of and for the immigrant Muslims dominate the discourse because they align with the official point of view, that the NKRI is a prime national value.

Generally speaking, the political position of the MMP is to uphold Papua as land of peace and this is in close accord with the political orientation of the Churches and NGOs in Papua. The MMP is not associated with matters of political integration or pro-Papua freedom, but it centres its attention on the establishment of justice in the context of making Papua a land of peace. If it is traced further, the political goal for Papua as a land of peace places the MMP between Indonesian and Papuan nationalist positions. The national government and the military often take into account the views of this middle group (Elisabeth, 2004)..

The Indonesian political identity operates in the interests of national integration. It determines the relative positions of immigrant-based Islamic organisations and the MMP in the field of Islamic organisations. The Muslim immigrants seem to treat nationalism as a theological construction or as a political religion (Smith, 2003: 180) and, therefore, they do not separate concepts of nationalism and Islamic principles. Islamic organisations that are oriented to Muslim immigrants are in close accord with the sentiments and goals of Indonesian nationalism. As the Muhammadiyah argues, it is bringing Papua into the fold of the motherland. With such a political identity, the Muslim immigrants are not close to the native Papuans who have their own political identity, that is, Papua-ness. The Muslim immigrants are in a dominant position and reinforce their political identity through social practices supported by Islamic organisations; they have indirectly preserved and perpetuated the social construct that Islam is identical with NKRI. As well, in the

field of politics, the presence of Muslim immigrants has strengthened the national government's domination of native Papuans and the immigrant population does not support demands for national dialogue and the settlement of disputes over human rights and community violence. Muslim Papuans also must deal with the Christian Papuans in the matters of politics and religion. The following section describes how the Muslim Papuans assert their identity to the Christian Papuans.

Muslim Papuans and Christian Papuans

The political identity arena for this study includes the field of Islamic organisations and the field of politics and religion. If the Islamic organisations are to maintain and support their religion's social practices, then this might require at times political and legislative support but these must apply to all inhabitants of Papua equally; Christians and native and immigrant Muslims. The organisations that support the social aspects of the Christian Churches, and the Churches themselves, have far more symbolic capital than does Islam because they are seen as a part of the culture and identity of Papua. In this regard the Christians have a superior position compared with other religions.

The Christian Churches have significant roles in sustaining and reinforcing Papuan identity because the Church paved the way for native Papuans to advance and to know who they are. Mawene (2003: 54–55) in his book, *Ketika Allah menjamah Papua*, explains that Papua has been a Christian land from the time Ottouw and Geissler first set foot in Papua.

The chairman of the Baptist Church of Papua, the Reverend Socrates Sofyan Yoman, (2005) in his book, *Orang Papua bukan separatis, makar, dan OPM*, portrays the roles of the Christian Churches as follows. First, the coming of Christianity to Papua brought messages of moral order, human rights and help with the problems of Papua. The second role is to put wrongs right; there is racial and religious discrimination at the national level in Indonesia; for example, a church

in West Java has been closed by local government authorities and the reason given for this action was that no permission had been given from Muslim majority, but the building and development of mosques in Papua is widespread and Islamic law is put into practice in Aceh. The third role is to explore the historical causes of Papuan problems that have followed from colonial administrations, marginalisation under the New Order, Special Autonomy and the creation of new provinces and the discrimination accorded the Melanesian race. The same points are made by Agus Alua, a Catholic priest, in his book, *Papua Barat dari pangkuan ke pangkuan*.

The classification of Papua as Christian is a form of politicisation of religion. The Catholic Church has different opinion from other Christian (Protestant) churches. Fr Saul Wanimbo (in Arwam, 2003: 88) talks about the strategies that the Papua natives employ in their struggle for the right to self-determination. When religion engages in political activity it cannot promote the cause of freedom because its essential role has been curbed.

The contest for political identity can manifest itself in those areas where politics and religion must intersect. Some examples are the rejection by Christian Papuans in 2005 of the proposal to build a great mosque in Manokwari; and their opposition in 2007 to the proposed local government regulations to give Manokwari status as a holy city; their rejection of the establishment of STAIN (State Islamic Institute) of Al-Fatah Jayapura in 2007; and their rejection of the building of mosques in Pegunungan Tengah in 2007. This summary only has space enough for one account, that of the rejection of STAIN's plans. The case started with land being bought from the Kaigere tribe by STAIN for a campus building. Indonesian Priests' Association (Asosiasi Pendeta Indonesia) in Jayapura objected saying that the transaction did not accord with *adat* regulation because no permission had been received from the great *Ondoafi* (leader of a set of tribes). Nevertheless, according to the vice-leader of the Adat Council of Papua, each tribe has its own way of dealing with the transaction of land. STAIN Al-Fatah consulted

Thaha M Alhamid, the founder of SMP–MMP, to help cope with the problem. Thaha resolved the dispute by explaining to the Governor of Papua that STAIN building would be used for the empowerment of native Papuans, so Papua could be land of peace in the future because all would have been educated in Papua system. The intentions of the Papuan Christians in rejecting the

STAIN application to build might have been to maintain domination over the Muslims, but Thaha's intention might also have been to strengthen the presence of Islam in Papua. One result is that the social capital of the Papuan Muslims can be considered to have increased because the governor accepted the establishment the institute.

Based on the examples in the previous paragraphs, it can be understood that it is the religious habitus that determines those political actions. For example, development of STAIN Al-Fatah involved political manoeuvres by the Muslim immigrants that were influenced by their religious habitus; that is, developing an Islamic mission involves political and religious negotiation in which Muslim immigrants are in a subordinate position. The rejection of the Great Mosque and STAIN AL-Fatah show that the religious habitus of the Christian Papuans is less moderate when the combination of politics and religion puts them in dominant position.

The power struggle involving politics and religion is also through discourse between the various religious organisations. The dominant Papuan Christians Papua contend that Christianity is the legitimate religion and culture of Papua and that Islam is for immigrants or Indonesians and Malays. The Muslim immigrant only develop discourses that their presence in Papua is needed for the interest of social and economic development. Islam as religion of the native Papua, constructed by the Muslim Papua, is heterodoxy that is an idea to oppose the dominant idea of The Muslim immigrant as well as The Christian Papua. The dominant identity in the field of politics and religion in Papua, is the Christian Papua. That idea has been internalised through discourses, so it has created religion's habitus of the Christian Papua.

Furthermore, that idea has been objectified through representations in religion, social and political practices, for the common in every day life.

If it is traced further, the Muslim Papua and the Christian Papua have the same habitus before Papua integration into Indonesia that is as a family religion. Nevertheless, the end of New Order, it looks like change of habitus Christian Papua from moderate into less moderate and from open into relatively closed. They use traditions and culture as capital symbolic to prevent development of the Muslim immigrant in Papua. In identity contestation, the Muslim immigrant do not have significant role because they are not part of the native Papua. It is different with the Christian immigrant that can collaborate with Christian Papua to keep up Christian domination over Muslim in Papua.

In cases of STAIN Al-Fatah, the conflict is between the Christian immigrant, represented by Indonesian Priests' Association (*Asosiasi Pendeta Indonesia*), and the Muslim immigrant, represented by Islamic Private Foundation (Yayasan Wiraswasta Islam). The conflict did not develop into communal violence due to the Muslim Papua and the Christian Papua can negotiate their conflicting interest and prevent such conflict. The negotiation is possible because both of them come from the same culture and religion habitus, that is, the culture of family religion.

Conclusion

Based on above description, it can be concluded that, first, Papuan Muslims, who are in a subordinated position, attempts to get recognition of its cultural identity that fluid in the middle of Special Autonomy in Papua. The second, the Muslim Papua that in subordinated position in the field of Islamic organisations contest its cultural identity to the Muslim immigrant by construction of Papua political identity represented in the discourse of *Islam as rahmatan lil Papua* and Papua as land of peace and also practices of human right struggle for the native Papua. The third, the Muslim Papua that in subordinated position in the field

of politics and religion, contest its cultural identity with the Christian Papua by construction Islam is the religion of the native Papua and practices of conflict's mediation between the Muslim and the Christian Papua, which related with the development of mosques and Islamic schools. The strategy of Muslim Papua in struggle for recognition of its cultural identity is undertaken by formulation of its identity fluidly and acculturation between Papua-ness and Islam-ness in the field of identity politics in Papua and also by internal consolidation through establishment of Papua Muslim Assembly (MMP).

Refer Collin (2000: 10), relation between the Muslim Papua and the Christian Papua is outsider with position and insider within relation. They live together and share with the same history, but the Muslim Papua thinks that they have a different identity and position with the Christian Papua. Refers to Simmel conception on the stranger (Simmel 1996), the Muslim Papua can be said as the stranger in Muslim and Christian community. The Muslim immigrant do not like the political orientation of the Muslim Papua that be closer to the Christian Papua concerning with the issue of human right violence. Nevertheless, the Muslim immigrant needs the existence of Muslim Papua to negotiate and relate the Muslim community with the Christian Papua in social issues such as the establishing of mosques and Islamic schools.

Refers to Bourdieu (1991), the association of Papua to Christian is the dominant cultural identity in the field of politics and religion, as Indonesia-ness is the dominant political identity in the field of Islamic organisations. Both of them are resulted from the symbolic and power struggle between religious institutions. Both of the field of Islamic organisations and the field of politics and religion in Papua is laid down inside broader the field of politics that being occupied by the Indonesia and Papua nationalist.

If the field of Islamic organisations in Papua stands in structural homology with the field of politics, so the field on politics and religion is different. It is due to the religion as basis on that field is not equal with the political contestation between Indonesia and Papua nationalist.

Nevertheless, the field of economy and the field of politics, according to Bishop of Jayapura and secretary general of PDP, influences the field of politics identity. As evidence, the resistances of the Christian Papua against Muslim immigrant in the field of politics and religion is carried out to respond experiences of injustices in economic and political field the native Papua is in subordinated position. The identity politics arena and social agents in this study can be seen in picture below to enable of description. It is noted that the picture does not represent all of the complexity of social reality, but only take description on Muslim Papua, Muslim immigrant, Christian Papua and Christian immigrant.

According to Bourdieu (1991), identity is constructed by social actors as performative discourse that is developing into domination instrument over the subordinated groups or resistance instrument to the dominant group. Both of the construction of identity is put into practice in objective power relation among social groups. The construction is social process covering socialisation, internalisation, objectifications and inculcation continually. That social process is carried out by social practices, socialisation in family and community, ritual religion practices, or discourse construction. If social boundaries are socially constructed, so cultural identity become fluid.

This opinion is accordance with Stuart Hall (in Woodward 1999:51) that cultural identity is not essence but a matter of searching of position. As its implication, cultural identity contains of identity politics that is a politics of searching for position in certain society. Cultural identity as representation is not permanent because it is incomplete social construction but always in changes process. Compared with Geertz (1973) and Barth (1969), Bourdieu concepts in analysing of Papua is more relevant because Papua identity is not a matter of primordial attachment and Papua identity is not cultural identity but more a political identity.

The Configuration of Social Agents and Identity Politics Arena in Papua

Sources: interview data (processed)

= contestation, = coalition

The Field of Politics and Religion

Christian immigrants

Muslim immigrants

Identity politics arena

Muslim Papuans

Christian Papuans

The field of Islamic org.

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